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Abstract
Delays in the United States air transportation industry are increasing every year, with cor-
respondingly increasing costs. Delays are particularly bad at hub airports, due to the extra
demand placed on these connecting points. This paper addresses one approach to help alle-
viate this problem, that of shifting capacity from hub-and-spoke flights to nonstop flights.
In order to evaluate the effects of such a change, we analyze the market share and revenue
benefits of adding new nonstop flights to a market previously served only by connecting
service, and examine the actual cost of delays. The MIT Extensible Air Network Sim-
ulation, developed in support of this work, is also presented. For a sample analysis for
Continental Airlines, it is found that over $550,000 per day in additional profit could be
obtained by reassigning flights away from the congested hubs.
This document is based on the thesis of Terran Melconian submitted to the Depart-
ment of Aeronautics and Astronauticsat the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in par-
tial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Aeronautics and
Astronautics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Delays in the United States air transportation industry are increasing every year. In 1995,
19% of the domestic US flights of the 10 Major airlines were delayed according to the
FAA’s criterion of arriving 15 minutes late or more. By 1999, this figure had risen to 26%.
The situation at congested hub airports is even worse. In 1995, 18% of Continental’s do-
mestic flights were delayed, and 20% of flights through its Newark hub were delayed - lev-
els comparable to the nationwide average. By 1999, 35% of Continental’s flights through
the extremely congested Newark hub were delayed, while only 26% of Continental’s other
flights were delayed. Table 1.1 shows a comparison for those major airlines with enough
of both hub and nonstop flights for a comparison to be meaningful.
Table 1.1: Change in Delays for Hub and Other Flights
1995 1999
Carrier Non-Hub Delays Hub Delays Non-Hub Delays Hub Delays
AA 19.2% 20.0% 24.0% 29.9%
AS 26.8% 32.5% 20.2% 30.0%
CO 18.0% 20.3% 26.6% 34.9%
DL 18.7% 24.3% 18.6% 29.6%
UA 17.9% 24.2% 24.3% 30.7%
US 16.7% 18.5% 28.9% 38.6%
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No “silver bullet” for this problem has presented itself, and none appears to be waiting
in the wings. However, several approaches have the promise of incrementally ameliorating
delays, and if enough of these approach are combined, they could significantly improve the
situation.
This paper addresses one such approach, that of shifting capacity from hub-and-spoke
flights to nonstop flights. Fundamentally, the improvement is achieved by reducing demand
at hubs, where demand already exceeds capacity, and relocating this demand to less-used
airports where excess capacity is available.
1.2 Organization
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the key concepts. This includes a brief explanation of
the history leading to the current situation, as well as an introduction to key requirements
for the analysis and decisions made for the modelling.
Chapter 3 examines delay costs in detail, and provides a framework for their calcula-
tion which provides reasonable fidelity while minimizing computational difficulty and data
requirements.
Chapter 4 presents economic models for the calculation of revenue from nonstop flights
in a market otherwise served only by connecting flights. This is an extension of previous
models which were able to treat only those markets where all significant competition took
the form of nonstop flights.
Chapter 5 describes MEANS, the MIT Extensible Air Network Simulation. MEANS
was developed in support of this work, and provides detailed information about simulated
flight information which is critical for delay estimation.
Chapter 6 presents the overall approach. This includes the synthesis of the work ex-
plained in the previous chapters, and methods related to the overall analysis, such as the
selection of connecting flights to eliminate and nonstop flights to introduce.
Chapter 7 describes the results of this analysis. Those flights which could be improved
by being switched from hub service to nonstop service are identified, and the expected
economic results of such a switch are presented.
16
Chapter 8 suggests possible directions for future work, based on data availability, com-
putational complexity, and planned improvements to the MEANS model.
17
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Chapter 2
Overview
2.1 Historical Network Development - Hub and Spoke
Airline networks changed dramatically in the United States in the early 1980s, in the wake
of removal of regulations from the airline industry in 1978. Under the old system, flights
would take passengers directly from one major city to another, with smaller cities served by
connections from a nearby major city. In the current system, most passengers reach their
destination by taking one flight from their origin city to a “hub”, where many flights meet.
From this hub, they then take a second flight to their destination.
The reasons for this change in network topology are numerous, but all are fundamen-
tally related to the idea of economies of scale. It is important to understand that under
the regulated system, airline fares were set in part based on airline expenses - if an airline
showed high expenses, it would be allowed to raise its fares. Thus, the incentive to reduce
costs was not what it would have been in a free-market situation.
The simplest manifestation of these economies of scale appear in areas such as mainte-
nance, where staff and inventory costs can be reduced by having one central maintenance
facility. A subtler and more important reason for hub and spoke arrangements, however,
has to do with economies of scale applied to frequency and passenger preference.
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2.1.1 Supply and Demand
Demand in the air transportation market takes the form of transportation between one city
and another. However, the product which is actually supplied takes the form of seats on
flight legs, which may not directly connect the origin and destination of interest to cus-
tomers. Because of this, the organization of a network (point to point or hub and spoke)
can have a significant effect on the relationship between supply and demand observed by
the airline.
2.1.2 Frequency and Market Share
An airline product is generally viewed as a round-trip ticket from an origin to a destination;
non-round-trip tickets are sufficiently uncommon that many analyses ignore them. Every
airline offering service between two cities is competing in that market; the fraction of
passengers travelling between the cities who purchase tickets from a certain airline is the
market share of the airline in question.
Market share is largely a function of flight frequency. Thus, a carrier with ten flights
per day between two cities will have significantly more passengers than a carrier with only
three flights per day. This makes it desirable to have multiple flights with smaller aircraft
instead of one flight with a larger aircraft. However, there is a lower bound on the size
of aircraft which can be economically operated, and thus for a certain demand there is an
upper bound on the number of flights which can be offered.
A hub and spoke network topology has a consolidating effect which makes it possible
to justify more flights to each city. Suppose that the traffic between cities A and B, A and C,
and A and X is enough to justify two flights each per day with 100-seat aircraft. Suppose
we introduce a hub at X, such that passengers going from A to B go via X. However,
passengers from A to C will also be going via X, and of course so will the ones going
straight to X. This is shown in Figure 2-1. Thus, instead of having flights with 100-seat
aircraft from A to B, we have flights from A to X. The number of flights will be the same,
namely six. However, instead of having two flights to B, two to C, and two to X, there will
simply be six identical flights to X. Thus, the passenger at A who wants to go to B will no
20
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Figure 2-1: Simple Nonstop and Hub Networks
longer see two flights, he’ll see six. Exactly the same happens on the second flight segment,
from X to the destination city. This increased frequency provides a competitive advantage
to the carrier with the hub-based flights, which realizes a higher market share and increased
revenue. Alternatively, the carrier could use larger aircraft and reduce the number of flights
from each city. This would still provide higher frequencies than the initial nonstop system,
and it would also reduce the total number of legs, cutting costs.
2.2 The Costs of Hub and Spoke
The advantage of hub and spoke networks is that they concentrate traffic. The disadvantage
of hub and spoke networks is that they concentrate traffic. Consider the example from
above. Suppose in the non-hub case, there there was enough traffic from A to X to justify
two flights per day, and the same for B-X and C-X. This is a total of six flights per day at
X. Now, suppose we start routing all traffic through X. We now have (as described above)
six flights from A to X, six flights from B to X, and six flights from C to X. The traffic at
X, our hub, has tripled!
This becomes a problem when the airport at X starts running out of capacity. Today,
airports are running out of capacity, and hub airports are running out first due to the con-
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centrating effect described above.
For example, in 1999, there were 14,900,000 enplaned passengers at Newark and 12,500,000
at Orlando. However, because Newark is a hub, there are many operations which are not
reflected in the passengers counts, as they refer to connecting passengers - Newark had
457,000 operations, whereas Orlando had 366,000 operations. Furthermore, Orlando had
only 0.6% delayed flights, but Newark had over ten times as many.[1]
2.3 The Return to Nonstop Flights
In a world of uncongested airports, the traffic-concentrating effect of the hub design is
highly desirable. It would be foolish to remove a flight through a hub in order to add a
nonstop flight between two non-hub cities, as this would reduce all of the advantages that
made the hub desirable in the first place.
However, in the real world of very congested airports, congestion means delays, and
delays cost money. While it might not be desirable to replace a ideal hub flight with an
ideal nonstop flight, it can be very desirable to replace a delayed and costly hub flight with
a nondelayed nonstop flight. The costs of delay can outweigh the advantages provided by
routing the flight through the hub.
The purpose of this work is to motivate just such a change by analyzing its cost and
revenue effects.
2.4 Requirements for Analysis
An analysis of the differences in revenue and cost between hub and nonstop flights does
not necessarily require a full cost and revenue analysis of both situations. However, if a
full analysis is not performed, revenue and cost must be assessed for at least those flights
which change between the two situations, and the effect of the changes on the remainder
of the network must also be examined.
Thus, the choice between a cost/revenue evaluation of the entire network in both sit-
uations or of only the differences depends on the extent of the coupling between the
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added/removed flights and the rest of the network.
2.4.1 Delay Propagation
One of the difficulties with delay analysis and simulation is that delay from a delayed flight
propagates to subsequent flights. Each flight, in order to depart, requires an airframe, flight
crew, and cabin crew. In the worst case, the airframe, flight crew, and cabin crew from
an incoming flight will be assigned to three different subsequent flights. One incoming
flight can therefore delay three outgoing flights. If crews are not assigned as a group, this
becomes even worse. [8]
Because historical crew schedules cannot be obtained from airlines, this work considers
only the propagated delays from airframe, assuming that reserve crews are available to staff
the aircraft should the regularly scheduled crews be unavailable.
2.4.2 Analysis Time Window
The majority of air transportation occurs during the daytime. Thus, excess capacity is
almost always available at night, even at major hubs. It is therefore almost always the case
that any delays due to reduced capacity can be made up at night, allowing the next day to
start on schedule. Thus, analysis of a single day is adequate to capture all direct effects of
propagated delays; i.e. delays from one day will not continue into the next day.
There are additional effects, however, which cannot be captured with a single day’s
worth of information. If a flight is cancelled, the aircraft which was to have flown will start
the next day in a different place. The aircraft must be repositioned to where it’s supposed to
be before its first scheduled flight, or another aircraft must be substituted. There are costs
associated with both options, and these costs can be examined only by looking at a period
significantly longer than one day.
Algorithms for optimizing this recovery are themselves currently a significant area of
research. In order to focus on the hub vs. nonstop tradeoff, the analysis herein has lim-
ited itself to time windows of one day, to avoid influencing the results by better or worse
methods of long-term disruption recovery.
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2.4.3 Cost and Revenue Analysis
Because of the propagated nature of delays, it is extremely difficult to isolate the cost of
delays due to an individual flight. The cost of delays are therefore analyzed on a network
level. The MEAN simulation, explained in detail in chapter 5, provides the tools required
to examine the delays over the entire network.
Revenue is also difficult to isolate. Consider the simple case of a linear relationship
between frequency and market share. If airline Q has two flights from A to B each day,
and airline R has one flight, airline Q will get   of the passengers. However, if airline Q
cancels one of its flights, it will not lose half of its passengers. Assuming the flights are
not full, airline Q will get half of the total passengers with one flight. This is a loss of only
25% of its previous revenue, not half. As a result of this effect, passenger revenue (a linear
function of the number of passengers) is also calculated at a network level.
24
Chapter 3
Delay Cost Analysis
It has long been known that it is not possible to calculate the revenue from or cost of a single
flight leg. In the case of revenue, this is because demand is generally measured in terms of
an Origin-Destination market; any flight leg will carry passengers from many origins going
to many destinations, and it is not at all clear how much of the revenue from the passenger
in question should be allocated to the particular leg. In the case of costs, there are numerous
costs associated with the network which are difficult to assign to a single leg. For example,
the cost of crew is highly dependent on the number of hours that they are able to work in a
month, and this is in turn highly dependent on the details of the schedule. It is extremely
difficult to assign these costs to individual flights.
The costs of delays come from lost revenues and additional costs; as we already have
difficulties assigning revenues and costs to flight legs, it is clear that we will also have
difficulty determining the cost of delays from a single leg. If, for example, a flight is
delayed long enough that certain passengers miss their connection, what is the additional
cost or lost revenue from this? These passengers must be accommodated on other flights,
either by finding space on other flights or buying them tickets with another carrier. The
former is usually less costly than the latter, but the extent to which passengers can be
accommodated on other flights is dependent on when the next flights between the cities in
question are scheduled to occur, and how many seats are available. Alternatively, consider
the delay of one flight due to the late arrival of the aircraft required to fly it. In the worst
case, one late-arriving flight can delay three more, if the cockpit crew, cabin crew, and
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aircraft are to be used in three different outgoing flights and no replacements or spares
are available. However, the extent to which this occurs depends entirely on the timing
of subsequent flights and the resources available at the airport at which the flight is late
to arrive. Thus, we see that the cost of delay on a single flight is dependent not only on
that flight but on other flights as well. This dependence is at the heart of the difficulty in
modeling and estimating the cost of delays.
3.1 Prior Work in Delay and Cost Assessment
A great deal of work is currently being done to model and improve the delays in the Na-
tional Air System. One of the most interesting of these is the Approximate Network Delay
model, which attempts to model the propagation of delay throughout a network, thereby
capturing part of the dependence that makes delay modeling difficult.[8] However, this
model does not assign dollar values to the costs, but simply reports delays as times.
Those models which assign a dollar value to the cost of delay tend to use a fixed amount
per hour, possibly depending on the location of the aircraft during the delay (air, ground,
etc.)[7] These values do not take into account the differing costs of different aircraft. Some
work is currently being done using the Department of Transportation Form 41 data, which
provides information on the cost of aircraft depending on the aircraft type, but no work
using this methodology appears to have been published yet.
3.2 Fixed Hourly Cost Modeling
Fixed hourly costs are the current state of the art in modeling costs. In addition to their sim-
plicity of calculation, there are advantages to using a linear cost representation stemming
from the fact that a linear objective function makes certain optimizations more tractable.
The two sorts of fixed hourly costs which are used are an aircraft-independent cost and an
aircraft-dependent cost. The latter is more accurate and therefore of more interest.
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3.2.1 Form 41 Costs
“Form 41” is a form on which United States airlines report operating costs to the Depart-
ment of Transportation on a yearly basis. This information is broken down by category and
made available in a database. The section of costs of the most interest is the Flight Operat-
ing Cost section. The costs are reported in the Direct Flying Operations (containing Pilots
and Fuel), Maintenance (containing Direct Airframe, Direct Engine, and Maintenance Bur-
den), and Equipment Ownership (containing Depreciation, Rentals, and Insurance). All of
these costs are reported on a per-block-hour basis; a block hour is the time from when the
wheel blocks are removed from the aircraft prior to its departure to when they are replaced
after its arrival. Some of these costs are truly incurred on an hourly basis. Fuel, for exam-
ple, is clearly a cost which is directly related to the number of hours that the aircraft is in
use. Others, such as ownership costs, are not dependent on the number of hours the aircraft
in use, and it is somewhat artificial to report them on a block-hour basis.[9]
Depending on the type of delay in question, the categories of costs which should be
included in its estimation differ. If a delay occurs regularly, and is essentially permanent,
then it seems most reasonable to consider this delay as a simple lengthening of the amount
of time required for a particular flight. In this case, it is reasonable to include the full hourly
cost reported on the Form 41 data as the cost of the delay - as permanent delays occur, it
will likely be necessary to qualitatively change the schedule, and additional aircraft may
be required to serve the same cities with the same frequency. In the case of a one-time
temporary delay, however, it does not make sense to include the ownership costs of the
aircraft in the cost of the delay - no extra aircraft are required; if the aircraft is delayed by an
hour, it is simply used for an hour longer on that day. Table 3.1 summarizes the categories
in which costs are reported, and indicates to which type of delays they are applicable.
Some of the classifications shown in Table 3.1 are not entirely clear-cut and are worthy
of note. The direct maintenance cost is partly dependent on hours flown (for the 100-
hour checks) and partly independent (the calendar-time based checks). It is shown as being
included in the cost of an airborne delay, but it could be argued that it should not be included
in its entirety. Fuel is not shown as being part of the cost of a ground delay, although the
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Table 3.1: Cost Categories Included in Delay Cost Estimations
Delay Type Permanent One-Time One-Time
Airborne Ground
Cost Category
Direct Flying Operations
Pilots X X X
Fuel X X
Flight Maintenance
Direct X X
Burden X
Equipment Ownership
Depreciation X
Rentals X
Insurance X
aircraft is using some fuel while it is idling on the ground. It seems that the amount of
fuel used while on the ground is sufficiently smaller than to the amount of fuel used while
airborne that it can be neglected, but this classification could be argued. Finally, it may be
worthy of note that direct maintenance costs are not included for a ground delay, but crew
costs are. This is because crew hours are calculated based on block time, whereas aircraft
duty hours are calculated based on airborne time. Therefore, a delay on the ground counts
as time for the pilots but not for the airframe.
Another item of note is the lack of cabin crew costs, which are included in the overall
cost data reported, but not in the data broken down by aircraft type. Because the cabin crew
on an aircraft typically costs significantly less than the cockpit crew, historical practice has
been to ignore cabin crew costs.
Some example costs for common aircraft types, using the categorizations presented in
Table 3.1, are given in Table 3.2. It can be seen from this that the cost of a one-time delay
on the ground is a fraction of the total cost of operating an aircraft of the same type. By
using the total hourly cost from the Form 41 data to model the cost of delays, we may be
significantly overestimating them.
Of course, none of these costs include the costs of additional delays “down the line”
which may be caused by the initial delay. These costs can be estimated by using a model
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Table 3.2: Historical Hourly Costs for Assorted Aircraft Types
One-Time One-Time
Permanent Airborne Ground
A300-600 $3,960 $2,372 $675
A320-200 $1,959 $1,798 $579
B727-200 $2,238 $1,767 $714
B737-1/200 $1,716 $1,215 $486
B737-300 $1,874 $1,159 $439
B737-400 $2,041 $1,440 $562
B737-500 $1,587 $1,053 $401
B747-100 $6,032 $4,323 $1,178
B747-400 $5,992 $3,728 $1,245
B757-200 $2,316 $2,095 $627
B767-200 $2,754 $1,821 $677
B767-300 $3,212 $1,971 $723
B777-200 $3,594 $2,072 $790
DC-10-10 $4,496 $2,944 $882
DC-10-30 $4,410 $3,173 $805
DC-9-30 $1,654 $1,287 $535
F100 $1,685 $1,143 $606
L-1011-1/200 $3,970 $3,131 $1,045
MD-11 $4,153 $2,804 $941
MD-80 $1,835 $1,215 $513
such as AND to model delay propagation in conjunction with an hourly cost model.
3.3 Nonlinear Crew Costs
The hourly crew costs reported in the Form 41 data are simply the total amount spent on
crew on a yearly basis divided by the number of hours that the crew worked. This includes
items such as training expenses, and paying the crew for their minimum guaranteed times
even if they haven’t worked them. These costs may not be applicable in the case of delays,
as the pilots aren’t getting any extra vacation time, for example, as a result of working an
extra half an hour. On the other hand, it may also be the case that the pilots are delayed so
long that they are not able to fly their original schedule, and thus must be replaced. The
costs of this will be higher than an hourly cost multiplied by the pilots’ time.
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3.3.1 Restrictions on Pilot Schedule
The restrictions on the schedule a pilot is able to work come from the FAA’s Federal Avi-
ation Regulations (FAR) and from the pilots’ contract with their airline. There are three
types of limitations on the crew’s schedule, any of which could be violated by delays,
forcing the crew to reschedule. These limitations are:
1. Restrictions on the number of hours that a crew can fly between breaks
2. Restrictions on the amount of time that a crew can be on-duty, regardless of whether
this time is spent flying or waiting
3. Restrictions on the length of break that a crew must have in order to be able to return
to duty
These restrictions are discussed in more detail in the following sections, with details
from the FARs and from the NorthWest/ALPA contract, examined as an example.[3, 5]
The focus is on the cockpit crew, as has been done in much of the literature, due to a lack
of information about cabin crew costs and scheduling.[6]
Restrictions on Hours Flown
Most of the restrictions on the number of hours that a crew can fly come from section
121.471 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. The FARs require that a pilot not fly:
1. More than 1,000 hours per year
2. More than 100 hours per month
3. More than 30 hours in any 7 consecutive days
4. More than 8 hours between rest periods
It is the last of these which is of the most interest here. If the extra flight time intro-
duced by a delay would cause a crew to exceed their monthly allowed time, for example,
they can still complete their current duty period, and be rescheduled to reduce their flying
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time for later in the month. However, the requirement that a crew not fly for more than 8
hours without rest is more immediate, and is the requirement most likely to force a crew to
abandon their original schedule.
The wording of the regulation is significant. It reads “No certificate holder... may
schedule any flight crewmember and no flight crewmember may accept an assignment for
flight time... if that crewmember’s total flight time in all commercial flying will exceed
[conditions].” The significance of this is that it restricts assignment and acceptance of
assignment, not actual flight. Therefore, once a flight has begun, the crew need not abort it
and land at an alternate airport, even if finishing the flight will cause them to exceed eight
hours of flight time.
A crew will usually, in domestic operations, be scheduled to fly more than one flight
during a duty period. As indicated above, if the last leg of this series is delayed, there is no
effect beyond paying the crew extra for the extra time they’ve flown, and possibly adjusting
their schedule for subsequent days. However, if any of the previous legs are delayed, it
may not be possible for the crew to fly the last leg, as at the time of departure the expected
length of the flight would put them over the eight-hour limit.
Restrictions on Break Length
The FARs also provide requirements on the length of a break which must be given in order
for a crew to fly more than 8 hours in any 24-hour period. The rests must be:
1. 9 hours of rest for less than 8 hours of flight
2. 10 hours of rest for 8 to 9 hours of flight
3. 11 hours of rest for more than 9 hours of flight
However, these rest periods can be further reduced (to 8, 8, and 9 hours, respectively)
if longer breaks, of lengths specified by an even more complicated set of rules, are given
for the next rest.
If any delays are encountered during a series of flights, the crew will arrive later than
anticipated and begin their rest later than anticipated. If the amount of rest available to them
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is sufficiently shortened, it may be impossible for them to depart on their first scheduled
flight the next day, as the reduced amount of rest they obtained as a result of the delay no
longer meets the minimum requirements for them to fly again.
Additional requirements on rest period length can come from the airline/pilot contract.
In the NorthWest case, it is specified that all breaks shall be at least 9 hours (not 8), and
after more than 8.5 hours of actual flight time, the pilots must receive at least a 12-hour rest.
In this case, it is possible that any of the flights in a series might be delayed sufficiently to
increase the total flying time from under 8 hours to above 8.5 hours - in which case the total
rest time required would actually be increased, in addition to the actual time received being
reduced. This could result in the crew being unable to fly their planned departing flight on
the next day.
Restrictions on On-Duty Time
The FARs do not provide any restriction on the total amount of time that a crew can be
on-duty, but contracts between individual airlines and pilot unions do. The NorthWest
contract, which was examined as a sample, provides the following basic restrictions:
1. No duty scheduled to start between 0501 and 2159 (local time) may be scheduled to
last longer than 13 hours.
2. No duty scheduled to start between 2200 and 0500 may be scheduled to last longer
than 12 hours.
3. No duty may actually last longer than the scheduled maximum plus one hour.
There are further complications and refinements. If a 6-hour break is given during a
duty period which starts within certain hours, the length of the duty period can be extended
to 14 hours. If a break of less than 10 hours is given before a duty period, the maximum
scheduled length of the duty period is reduced to 11 hours. Further specifications exist for
redeyes, international flights, and other cases.
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3.3.2 Examination of Effects on Schedule
Sample Schedule
Ideally, an actual historical crew schedule would have been used to examine the effects
of delays at various points on the ability of the crew to complete their planned flights
without violating any of the requirements on their working and rest times. Regrettably, it
did not prove possible to obtain such a schedule, as these schedules are considered valuable
competitive information by the airlines and are not available for research purposes. It was
therefore necessary to use a hypothetical schedule instead.
To examine the costs of a crew’s inability to complete their scheduled set of flights,
a hypothetical schedule was therefore generated manually using a simplified set of con-
straints. The constraints used were:
1. No scheduled flight times longer than 8 hours per duty period
2. No duty periods longer than 13 hours scheduled or 14 hours actual
3. No rests shorter than 9 hours, scheduled or actual
These constraints obviously do not capture the entirety of the problem. It seems likely,
however, that they will provide a schedule which is similar in nature to that actually used,
and which will exhibit the same behavior in response to delays. The actual schedule gen-
erated was for a historical schedule with 7 aircraft and 40 flight legs. This schedule is
believed to be large enough to give a representative estimation of the effect of delays while
remaining a tractable problem for manual crew scheduling.
Results of Delay in Sample Schedule
The effects of delay on the schedule were examined by looking at each leg of each flight
and determining the largest delay which could be absorbed without forcing a replacement
crew to be used, assuming that all other legs run at their planned duration.
Three types of delays which could prevent a crew from completing their originally
scheduled flights were examined; these are an increase in flight time, an increase in duty
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Figure 3-1: Percentage of Delays Causing Crew Disruption
time, and a decrease in rest. All three of these types appeared in the sample schedule. The
majority of inabilities to complete the planned schedule resulted from expected flight time
exceeding 8 hours due to delay in one of the legs which was not the last one.
Using this information, it was possible to calculate the likelihood that a delay of a
certain length would result in a required schedule change. These results assume that delays
are equally likely at all airports in the schedule. With a larger schedule, it would have been
useful to examine the delay statistics of each of the individual airports, but given the size
of the sample schedule available, these results would not have been statistically useful.
The results, assuming delays are equally likely everywhere, are presented in Figure 3-1.
Costs of Schedule Disruption
The actual cost of a crew being unable to complete their originally scheduled flights is of
course highly dependent on how the disruption is handled. The details of how this is done
are generally not available, for the reasons discussed in 3.2.1, requiring some assumptions
to be made. Here, it is assumed that the crew which was not able to fly their original flights
will be deadheaded (flown as passengers) back to their base, while another crew is sent out
to take over for them.
The NorthWest contract indicates that pilots being deadheaded are paid at their full rate,
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Table 3.3: Sample NorthWest Hourly Crew Rates
Captain First Officer
A320 $175 $124
B747-400 $227 $154
B757 $183 $124
MD-80 $169 $115
as if they were flying the aircraft. The cost of deadheading four crew members (two back
to base and two from the base to where they must take over) is therefore quite significant.
Some hourly crew rates for full-seniority crew are given in Table 3.3.
3.4 Comparisons Between Linear and Nonlinear Model
In order to compare the cost estimates provided by the linear cost-per-hour model with
those provided by the nonlinear crew-schedule-disruption model presented above, we look
at the average cost of a delay in the latter. The probability of a delay resulting in schedule
disruption is multiplied by an average schedule disruption cost, taken from calculating the
average stage length of the schedule in question. This is added to a linear hourly cost for
the captain and first officer, using the rates indicated in Table 3.3.
Figure 3-2 presents a comparison between the model presented above and the fixed-
hourly-cost model using only crew costs, for a 767.
3.5 Conclusions
As can be seen from Figure 3-2, the agreement between the nonlinear schedule-disruption
model and the fixed hourly cost model using Form 41 data agree surprisingly well for
crew costs. It may be reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the fixed-hourly-cost model
is suitable for the majority of purposes, and that the nonlinear schedule-disruption model
has little to offer without specific information about the actual crew schedule in place at the
time of a particular delay. Such a model would be most appropriate for use at the airlines
themselves, where detailed information about the actual crew schedules is available.
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Chapter 4
New Nonstop Analysis
When the expected profitability of a new nonstop flight in a market not currently served
by nonstop service is considered, one of the most important factors is the expected market
share which will be obtained by the carrier introducing the nonstop flight. Current market
share models, which are designed for markets served primarily by nonstop service, include
exclusively nonstop flights; the number of passengers flying on other flights is generally
less than 20% and is considered negligible for most purposes. These market share models
are therefore inapplicable to situations where the market share of carriers who do not offer
nonstop service must be considered, and a model which takes into account other types of
service is required.
4.1 Models
The most common market share model gives market share as a function of frequency share.
This relation is given in Equation 4.1.
 	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(4.1)

is the market share of Carrier  for a particular market; 	
  is the number of non-
stop flights (or flights per time) of Carrier  in the market.  is an exponent representing
the advantage of carriers with higher frequency shares. This nonlinearity is sometimes ex-
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plained by the fact that most travelers plan round-trip itineraries, and are likely to fly on the
same carrier in both directions. Because of this round-trip planning, carriers’ market share
depends to some extent on the number of combinations of departing and returning flight
combinations they offer (the square of the frequency). Ultimately, the exponent is present
in the model because the data justifies it; it typically has values between 1 and 2.
This model can be extended to include through and connecting flights by modifying the
meaning of 	


to include not only nonstop flights, but a weighted sum of all available
flights. The model used here includes a term for flights with one stop and flights with one
connection; flights with more than one stop, more than one connection, or both a stop and
a connection are not included in the model. This is shown in Equation 4.2. The parameter

is the value of one-stop flights, and the parameter  is the value of one-connection flights.
These are fractions of the value of a non-stop flight, and should in all cases be between 0
and 1.
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4.2 Methodology
The model given by Eq. 4.1 and 4.2 has been used historically, with coefficients

325476
and

328419
. However, these values have not been verified in decades, and their applicability to
the current market is questionable. It was therefore desirable to determine new values for
these coefficients using recent market data.
An overview of the calculations is presented here.
4.3 Data Requirements
Two sources of data were required, one to provide information on the flights available and
one to provide information on the passengers who flew on each carrier. For the flight data,
the required information for each flight is:
1. Departure city
38
2. Departure time
3. Arrival city
4. Arrival time
5. Carrier
6. Flight number
The Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP) data provided the required informa-
tion. Other data sources, such as the Official Airline Guide (OAG) electronic data could
also have been used; the ASQP data was selected as a matter of convenience.
For the passenger data, the required information is the number of passengers carried,
broken down by OD market, carrier, and time. This information was provided by the O&D
Plus 10% ticket sample database, which provides information on 1 out of 10 tickets issued,
randomly selected. Both the O&D Plus and ASQP databases provided only information
for domestic flights by the 10 Major carriers.
4.4 Market Selection
The first operation was the selection of markets suitable for inclusion in the calculations.
Because the principal use for the model is to predict the effects of adding or removing
nonstop service, those markets in which nonstop service was added or removed were se-
lected. The markets selected are those which gained or lost nonstop service between 1995
and 1999, the years for which data was available. The markets must also have had at least
one full year both with and without nonstop service during the period for which data was
available, to reduce skewing of the results due to seasonal variations. The markets selected
were also required to have had a total of 40 nonstop flights (both directions) during the
period they were considered to have nonstop service; markets with a very small number
of nonstop flights (such as one per week) were therefore excluded. These criteria served
to exclude a number of markets which were served nonstop seasonally (winter or summer
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only), and those which were served for only a few months before being abandoned. 123
markets which met the criteria were found.
4.5 Frequency Calculation
The number of nonstop flights was trivially determined; the number of flight legs which
left from the one city of the pair and arrived at the other was counted. Determining the
number of one-stop and connecting flights required examining all pairs of flight legs which
lead from one city of the pair to the other, by way of any intermediate city (one carrier is
examined at a time). If the flight number is the same, the flight legs are counted as a one-
stop flight. If the flight numbers are not the same, the flight legs are examined for potential
inclusion as a connecting flight. To be counted as a connecting flight, the second leg must
depart at least 30 minutes, but not more than 120 minutes, after the arrival of the first leg.
Using these fixed values for connecting times greatly simplified the problem compared to
entering the actual connection times for each carrier and each airport, and is unlikely to
significantly skew the results.
Frequencies were calculated by quarter; the limiting factor was the 10% ticket sample
database, which provided data with a quarterly granularity.
4.6 Coefficient Calculation
Two methods were used for determining the coefficients b and c. A linear regression pro-
vided detailed error information with  constrained to 1; a nonlinear solution allowed  to
vary but did not provide coefficient-specific error information.
4.6.1 Linear Solution
Linear regression “solves,” in a minimum-error sense, Equation 4.3.
: ;=< >@? (4.3)
40
 is an ACB
9
matrix of coefficients; it is the desired result. : is an  B 9 matrix, and <
is an

BDA matrix. When
 
A , this equation has an exact solution; when
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linear regression is used to find the c which minimizes the error.
To perform a linear regression, the : and < matrices must be generated. In this case,
<
will be an  BGF matrix, as there are two coefficients in  . Rows in these matrices are
generated using Equation 4.4, where one row is generated for each carrier  in each market.
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Equation 4.4 results from straightforward algebraic manipulation of Equation 4.1 when
 is 1. Rows which were entirely zero (representing a carrier which has no flights and no
passengers in a particular market) were not included in the generated matrices.
4.6.2 Nonlinear Solution
The advantage of the nonlinear solution is that it removes the requirement that  be exactly
1. The disadvantage is that only an overall error is provided for the solution, and not a
per-parameter error as is provided by a linear regression.
General nonlinear optimization algorithms generally take the form of maximizing or
minimizing an objective function. In this case the objective is a function of  , b, and c. For
each carrier in each market, the difference between the calculated market share from the
given  ,

, and  values and the actual historical value was found; the root mean square of
this error value is the objective function to be minimized.
The specific algorithm used was the Nelder-Mead algorithm. This algorithm, which
is general-purpose but not particularly efficient, was chosen for simplicity. Because this
problem was a relatively tractable one, the slow running speed was not important. The
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Table 4.1: Connecting Flight Value Linear Fit Results
Value Standard t-statistic
error
b (one-stop) 0.1748 0.0063 27.7
c (connection) 0.0129 0.0003 43.0
specific algorithm used should not affect the final result.
4.7 Results
4.7.1 Linear Results
The linear results, with an assumed  =1, are presented in Table 4.1. The principal purpose
of the nonlinear model is to examine the significance of the coefficients, and it can be seen
that the fit is quite good and both coefficients are significant.
The value of connecting flights is much lower than that of non-stop flights, even though
it is not clear that these flights take longer to complete. Part of this is undoubtedly due to
the fact that infeasible connections - those which go across the country and then back - are
included, even though it is unlikely that a significant number of passengers will fly them.
The presence of one-stop flights before connecting flights on the CRS menus undoubtedly
explains part of this as well.
4.7.2 Nonlinear Results
The nonlinear results are presented in Table 4.2. The nonlinear solution does not provide
per-parameter errors statistics like a linear regression does; the total root mean square error,
calculated as described in section 4.6.2, was 0.144.
The nonlinear results provide higher values for the  and  coefficients than the linear
solution. This is likely a consequence of the restrictions on  present in the linear solution.
Because carriers with nonstop flights also tend to be the ones with high market shares,
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Table 4.2: Connecting Flight Value Nonlinear Fit Results
Parameter Value
 1.107
b 0.233
c 0.048
the nonlinearity which is an effect of  was artificially captured as low values of

and  ,
which also served to further increase the market share of those carriers with above-average
marketshares.
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Chapter 5
The MIT Extensible Air Network
Simulation
The MIT Extensible Air Network Simulation (MEANS) is an event-based simulation tool
which can be used to analyze current and hypothetical network configurations and rules.
The discussion of MEANS is divided into three sections: data sources, calculation
methods, and results.
5.1 Data Sources
Several types of data are required by the simulation. These include a schedule of flights,
airborne rates and times, arrival and departure rates at airports, and time required for taxi
and other ground events. Each of these is addressed below.
5.1.1 Schedule of Flights
The schedule of flights for historical days is obtained from the Airline Service Quality
Performance (ASQP) database. This database was selected over sources such as the Official
Airline Guide (OAG) data because it has the highly desirable property of including the
registration number of the aircraft. The aircraft registration number is crucial for following
an aircraft through its flights and correctly modeling the propagation of delays.
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The major limitation of the ASQP database is that it includes information only for do-
mestic jet flights operated by the ten US Major airlines. The OAG database includes all
scheduled commercial flights, but still does not include freight or general aviation traffic.
To address these data limitations, a count of all operations in 15-minute periods was ob-
tained from the FAA’s Consolidated Operations and Delay Analysis System database[2].
This count enabled flights to be generated and added to the flights in the ASQP database,
bringing the total level up to the historical value.
5.1.2 Airborne Performance
In the US, the principal cause of delays is a lack of capacity at airports, not in the air.
MEANS therefore uses a simple model based on historical information. The average air-
borne times between two cities is used when historical information is available. Where
historical information is unavailable, an approximate airborne time is calculated from dis-
tance and scheduled time using a formula developed as a “best fit” from those cases where
actual data was available.
It is also possible to vary airborne times around the average, but the results of the
simulation are generally quite insensitive to small changes in airborne time. It might be
possible to obtain better results by segregating the results by aircraft type, but this approach
was not pursued for reasons of tractability.
5.1.3 Ground Operations
Times required for ground operations are determined in a manner similar to those used for
airborne times, described above. Times are calculated by airport, but not by aircraft type or
configuration for reasons of data availability and numerical complexity. [11]
5.1.4 Weather
Historical weather information from the CODAS database is used as weather input. His-
torical data has the advantage that it captures the correlations between proximate cities;
alternative approaches such as a Markov-chain generated weather model do not capture
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this. The CODAS data provides wind and visibility data from which it is possible to deter-
mine the operating condition of the airport, as well as a note as to whether the conditions
were Instrument or Visual Meteorological Conditions.
5.1.5 Airport Arrival and Departure Rates
The calculation of the arrival and departure rates has been one of the most difficult and
involved parts of the MEANS development. As a result of this, several different sources
of data have been used. Historical data from tower logs at the Boston Logan airport were
used in the initial development of the simulation, as these provided the most detailed and
accurate information. These were later replaced with capacity envelopes from the FAA
Benchmark report. [1]
5.2 Calculation Methods
The central data structure in MEANS is the flight leg. Flight legs are updated and modified
as flights are rescheduled or delayed, and are passed between different parts of the program
as the flight moves. There are a number of states in which a flight leg can be. It can be
inactive (another flight leg with the same aircraft is still in progress), at the gate, taxiing
out, waiting to depart, in the air, waiting to arrive, and taxiing in. Timing is controlled
through a queue of events; any of the modules can schedule an event to occur later. Having
a routine which handles one event and schedules another for later is the most common way
of having recurring actions.
5.2.1 Flight Data Structure
For each flight leg, an airline, flight number, tail number, departing and arriving city, and
scheduled, rescheduled, and controlled departure and arrival times are stored. Additionally,
the actual time of all state transitions is recorded as the flight leg changes states. Time is
recorded as seconds after a defined point. For a single-day situation, this can be seconds
after midnight; for multiple day runs, seconds since the Unix epoch (midnight January 1,
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1970, GMT) is a convenient choice. Figure 5-1 shows the states through which a flight
passes.
5.2.2 Schedule Loading and Generation
Because some flights do not have full information in the ASQP data and must be added
based only on operation counts, a special case for the format must exist to mark these
flights. Special symbols for airline and departure/arrival airports are used to identify these
“padding” flights, and allow them to be processed properly.
The schedule is read from a custom-format data file, which includes exactly the infor-
mation required, and written to another simply formatted file which includes the originally
scheduled information plus the information about actual times. This is the principal output
of the simulation, and most results are obtained by postprocessing this file.
For the flight legs without complete information, however, a full schedule file is not
available to the simulation. Instead, an abbreviated description is used, which specifies the
number of arrivals and departures to be added in a given time period at a given city. Several
methods are available for specifying this information. The additions can be specified as a
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total number of legs to add, a total target number (in which case the number to add will be
calculated based on the number of flights already present in the schedule), or a percentage
of the scheduled flights which should be added.
One piece of information which cannot be left out, even for these flights, is the aircraft
tail number. This is vitally important to obtain proper delay propagation. Furthermore,
assigning each leg a unique tail number is an inadequate approach. In a ground delay
program, only arrivals are controlled. Since arrivals become departures, the number of de-
partures must be reduced when the arrivals are reduced. However, this can not be achieved
if some of the departures are not recognized as being the same aircraft as the arrivals.
Thus, the algorithm which inserts “fake” flights attempts to match incoming and outgoing
tail numbers, based on assumptions on the minimum turn time of the aircraft.
5.2.3 Taxi and Airborne
Historical information for taxi and airborne times is read from a datafile. The data file
presents information by percentile, and an appropriate percentile or distribution is selected
by the simulation. Taxi data will always be available, but airborne data may need to be
calculated. In this case, information about the distance between the two cities and the
scheduled duration are used to calculate an approximate airborne time.
When an aircraft is passed to the taxi or airborne handler, the handler calculates the time
required and schedules an event at the appropriate time in the future to pass the aircraft to
the next state.
5.2.4 Tower Controller
The tower controller, which passes aircraft from the departure queue into the air and from
the arrival queue onto the ground, is one of the most complex parts of the simulation. It
is responsible for metering the flow of aircraft and ensuring that appropriate separation
standards are not violated.
In its most basic implementation, the tower is supplied with a fixed arrival and departure
rate, from a source such as historical data. It schedules arrival and departure events to occur
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at times evenly spaced throughout the hour, and whenever there is a slot for an aircraft to
depart or arrive, the next aircraft in the queue is processed. No trading between departures
and arrival is possible.
A more sophisticated implementation of the tower uses a Pareto frontier showing the
number of possible arrivals for a given number of departures. In this case, the tower con-
troller must periodically select an operating point on the curve (an action notionally corre-
sponding to selecting a configuration or runway allocation). The algorithm used to calculate
this operating point has significant effects on the behavior of the system.
Presently, the operating point is chosen using information about both scheduled flights
in the future and flights currently waiting. The number of departures and arrivals expected
in the next period (often one hour) are calculated, and added to the number of departures
and arrivals currently waiting in the queue. An operating point is selected such that the
ratio of the actual departures to arrivals is the same as the ratio of desired departures to
arrivals. This has worked well in practice.
A given airport will have data for multiple Pareto frontiers, corresponding to operating
states such as Visual or Instrument Flight Rules (corresponding to the Visual and Instrument
Meteorological Condition weather conditions). Other specialized local configurations may
also sometimes occur, such as differing capacities as a function of wind direction. Some-
how the simulation must select one of these to be in effect at any given time. The simplest
way of doing this again requires the configuration of all airports to be directly specified in
a data file; this is most useful for modelling exact historical situations where such informa-
tion is available. An alternative approach, which is capable of selecting between VFR and
IFR configurations for each airport, calculates the conditions based on visibility and ceiling
information from the weather at the airport in question.
5.2.5 The FAA and Ground Delay Programs
When delays become particularly bad at an airport, a Ground Delay Program is put in place
to hold aircraft travelling to that airport on the ground, as waiting on the ground is safer
and less expensive than waiting in the air. Thus, MEANS has a ground delay program
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implementation which models the FAA in instituting ground delay programs.
In its simplest form, a datafile can be provided with historical ground delay program
information. This specifies the beginning and end of the ground delay program, the arrival
rates, and the time at which the program is announced.
A more sophisticated approach uses predicted airport capacities (based on predicted
weather) to automatically institute a GDP when demand exceeds capacity by a certain
amount.
Once a GDP has been initiated through any of the above methods, it must be performed.
This involves generating and assigning slots to flights. The algorithm used by MEANS is a
simplified implementation of the ration-by-schedule algorithm with compression, outlined
below.
First, a list of flights is generated with originally scheduled arrival times in the window
over which the GDP is operating is generated; this list is sorted by arrival time. A table of
slots is then generated based on the predicted arrival rate. The slots are allocated to airlines
in the same order as the originally-scheduled flights, up to the number of slots in the table
(there will obviously be fewer slots than original flights). This is the ration-by-schedule
algorithm.
Each slot then has a flight assigned to it. This is done by finding the next available flight
from the airline to whom the slot belongs and assigning it to the slot. This examination of
the schedule of flights includes any delays the airline has already made to the schedule,
unlike the original slot assignment. Thus, it is possible that it will not be possible to fill
a slot with a flight from the desired airline, if the only candidate flight has been delayed
until after the time of the slot. In this case, a flight from another airline is shifted forward,
with the displaced airline getting priority for the slot opened up by the move. This is the
compression algorithm.
Once the initial assignments have been made, the airline agents are notified, and allowed
to swap and cancel flights. When a flight is cancelled and the airline cannot find another
flight to assign to its slot, the compression algorithm is rerun.
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5.2.6 The Airline
In practice, an airline will decide which flights should suffer the most based on criteria
such as loads, missed connections, or maintenance requirements. However, data for these
considerations is not available to MEANS. At present, therefore, the airline agents simply
cancel flights which will be delayed more than a specified maximum amount by the GDP.
Two hours has been used as this maximum for work done to date.
5.3 Results
In testing, MEANS was evaluated in two scenarios - one in which heavy delays at one
airport made the rest of the system irrelevant (for which Boston on January 28, 1999 was
an example), and a summer day when the overall load was high but no particular locations
had a dominant delay (an example of which was July 30, 1999). The simulation performed
well in the former case and reasonably in the latter.
Figure 5-2 shows the aircraft in the arrival and departure queues at Boston Logan airport
on January 28, 1999. Boston had severe inclement weather on this day, and a ground delay
program was in effect most of the day. As described in section 5.1.1, the flights with
information obtained from the ASQP database were supplemented with generated flights
from the ETMS data. In order to allow for a valid comparison with the historical ASQP
queue sizes, these generated flights were not included in the count of the aircraft in the
queue. As can be seen from the figure, the MEANS results track the historical results from
the ASQP data quite well.
Figure 5-3 shows the simulated and actual arrival times of flights arriving at Boston on
this day.
Figure 5-4 shows results for a few sample cities for the case of July 30, 1999, when there
was good weather and generally heavy traffic across the system. The results are better for
some cities than others. Particularly, those cities with more straightforward operations and
fewer operating conditions are better simulated.
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Figure 5-2: MEANS Queue Sizes, Boston, January 28, 1999
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Figure 5-3: MEANS Arrival Times, Boston, January 28, 1999
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Figure 5-4: MEANS Results, BOS, IAH, and PHX, July 30, 1999
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Chapter 6
Approach
It is not possible to calculate the effect of all possible schedule alterations in full detail due
to the computational complexity of such a task. Therefore, a two-stage approach is used,
in which preliminary calculations of lower accuracy are performed to identify plausible
flights for replacement, and then a full calculation is performed using this set of candidates.
The preliminary calculations ignore the network-wide effects of changes, in order to avoid
recalculating the entire scenario.
This calculation procedure is shown in Figure 6-1. Each step is described below.
6.1 Cost Calculations
6.1.1 Determination of Hourly Costs
The hourly cost for an aircraft type is calculated from Form 41 data, as described in section
3.2.1. Two values are calculated, for time spent on the ground and time spent in the air,
using costs as shown in table 3.1. Because the purchase and sale of aircraft is not being
considered, ownership costs are not required.
6.1.2 Determination of Aircraft Type
The type of aircraft is not actually included in the ASQP data. It must be looked up sepa-
rately. The JP Fleet database was used to do this.
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Figure 6-1: Information Flow
However, the ASQP data contains some errors in its reported tail numbers, and some
aircraft are missing from the JP Fleet database. When the tail number of an aircraft could
not be found, an attempt was made to determine the aircraft type by looking at aircraft
which flew the same leg on other weeks in the same month. Of the 9.4% of the data which
could not originally be looked up, over
 
 were amenable to this technique, leaving only
2.7% unknown. For these few, an average value for the carrier’s known fleet was used.
6.1.3 Preliminary Cost Calculations
The cost of operating a flight, from the point of view of preliminary analysis, is taken to be
only the direct operating costs of the flight, calculated from the amount of time it spends
in various states. The indirect effect of changed costs in other flights due to delays which
would be reduced or increased by changes to the flight in question were not taken into
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account.
For the case of an existing flight which is being considered for removal, the operating
cost of the flight is calculated from the simulated times it spends on the ground and in the
air, including delays. This will cause heavily-delayed flights to be favored for removal, as
desired.
For the case of a flight which has not been flown historically or simulated and is being
considered for addition, no delay information is available, so the flight is analyzed based
on the schedule. Because the focus is on adding flights which will not be severely delayed,
the cost due to delay is small compared to the base cost calculated from the schedule time.
Delays will be taken into account in the final analysis.
6.1.4 Final Cost Calculations
For the final cost calculations, the total cost of two complete scenarios are being compared.
These costs are calculated by summing the costs of all flights for all operations, not just
those flights which differ between the scenarios. This fully captures the indirect effects of
delay reduction, wherein cancelling one flight causes other flights at the same airport to be
delayed less due to reduced demand.
This calculation is more accurate than the preliminary calculation because it captures
the network-wide effects. However, it also makes it difficult to analyze the effects of in-
dividual flights. Thus, while the final calculation produces better overall results, it is less
useful in providing an intuitive understanding of the phenomena.
6.2 Revenue Calculations
6.2.1 Frequency Calculation
Frequencies are calculated using the fundamental approach described in Chapter 4 for com-
paring nonstop frequencies with those of one-stop and connecting flights. Connecting and
one-stop flights are weighed as described in sections 4.6.2 and 4.7.1, which describe the
nonlinear solution procedure. One additional consideration is the perceived devaluation of
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flights based on delay. Previous work has shown that passengers perceive flights as becom-
ing less valuable by 2.5 divided by the length of the flight in minutes for each minute of
mean delay. [10] This is shown in Equation 6.1
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The effect of this is to cause passengers to favor flights with less delay over flights
with more delay. The relative value of connecting flights versus nonstop flights is largely
unchanged, as this effect is already captured by the general weighting of connecting and
one-stop versus nonstop flights, described in section 4.6.2. The significance of this delay-
based devaluation is that it causes heavily delayed connecting flights to be perceived as less
valuable than less-delayed ones, an effect which is not captured by the general weighting
applied to all connecting flights. This decrease in effective frequency reduces the revenue
obtained from delayed flights in the base case, due to decreased passenger preference. This
causes the revenue loss from cancelling connecting flights through extremely congested
and heavily delayed hubs to decrease, because these flights were worth less in the base case
and thus had less to lose.
6.2.2 Preliminary Revenue Calculations
Revenue is calculated by assigning market share using frequencies, as described in section
4.1. When a flight is considered for cancellation, the effect on the carrier’s frequency in all
markets served by that flight is calculated. The cost of cancelling the flight is taken to be
the difference in the revenue obtained from the set of frequencies which includes the flight
in question and the set of frequencies which does not.
When a flight is considered for addition, the expected revenue gain is calculated in a
similar manner. However, the new flight is not considered for part of a connection; only
the increased frequency in the nonstop market served directly is considered. Because the
delays are not recalculated for hypothetical cancellations in the preliminary analysis, the
delay-weighted frequencies cannot be updated.
For simplicity, each aircraft is assigned to exactly one city-pair, flying back and forth
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throughout the day. Because most city-pairs selected do not have existing nonstop service,
it is not possible to use historical times; theoretical times calculated from distance are
therefore used. In addition to the airborne times calculated from the distance, average taxi
times are added.
The city pairs considered here are too close for a “red eye” overnight flight to be of
interest, so it is assumed that a 14-hour window is available in which to schedule flights.
From the leg length calculated as described above, the number of legs which can be flown
in one day is calculated; a universal 40-minute time on the ground between legs is assumed.
This number of flights is used to generate new frequencies, which in turn produce a market
share. This market share is combined with the total demand and average fare for the market
to produce a revenue. A check is performed to ensure that the capacity of the aircraft at a
reasonable load factor is not exceeded.
6.2.3 Final Revenue Calculations
In the final revenue calculations, a new set of weightings is calculated from the actual
delays of running the new scenario. These are then used in the revenue calculations for the
new scenario, fully capturing the network-wide effects of the delays. The expected market-
share-based revenue is then calculated for all flights in the original and new scenarios, not
just those which were modified.
This network-wide approach includes the effects of new delay weightings for flights.
This means that additional revenue realized by reducing delays on those hub flights left in
place as a consequence of reduced demand at the hub is included. So is any revenue from
connections which may have been introduced as a side effect of the new nonstop flights.
Like the final cost calculations, the final revenue calculations provide a more accurate
result, but also make it impossible to examine the effect of an isolated change.
6.3 Scenario Generation
In order to perform the final calculations, MEANS must be run on a hypothetical scenario
generated from the preliminary calculations. The generation of this scenario consists of
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removing those flights which are being replaced, and inserting those which are being added.
Flight durations are calculated as described in section 6.2.2. Flights are started in an east to
west direction due to time zone considerations, and simply fly back and forth between the
designated cities with the specified number of flights.
MEANS is rerun with this replacement schedule, and all of the results which depend on
the MEANS output are recalculated, to allow the full network-wide effects to be included
in the final calculations.
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Chapter 7
Results
Continental’s flights in the Newark and Houston hubs were considered for replacement
using the methodology described in Chapter 6. Because many flights visit both hubs in the
same day, it was not possible to isolate one hub. Results are therefore presented for both
hubs.
7.1 Preliminary Results
In the preliminary calculations, a set of 59 flights to be replaced were identified, with a more
profitable replacement for each. Table 7.1 shows the average effect of these replacements.
All values are in dollars, calculated on a daily basis. For comparison, results which include
the effects of delays and results which do not include the effects of delays are presented,
to show how much of the improvement is possible only because of delays in the current
situation.
The revenue loss is the amount of revenue which is lost from the cancellation of the
existing legs; the revenue gain is the revenue obtained from the addition of the new legs.
The case which does not include the effect of delays ignores the perceived decrease in fre-
quency due to the devaluation of delayed flights; the case which considers delays includes
this effect.
The operating cost change is the difference in cost between the old and new scenarios.
In the case which does not include the effect of delays, the operating cost is calculated based
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Table 7.1: Average Results of Preliminary Calculation for Continental
Without effect of delays
Revenue Loss 13015
Revenue Gain 20726
Op Cost Increase 2206
Net Profit Increase 5504
Including effect of delays
Revenue Loss 12128
Revenue Gain 23004
Op Cost Increase 1886
Net Profit Increase 8990
on the scheduled times; the case which considers the effect of delays includes the extra cost
arising from delays. The positive number indicates a higher cost in the new flights than the
old. This is due to the increased utilization which is obtained as a consequence of no longer
needing to time flights to meet banks of connections. Complete data is given in Appendix
A.
Some of the flights which are suggested for replacement would have been desirable
(although less so) to replace even without delays, but many flights become desirable to
replace only due to delay effects. Approximately 1/3 of the replacements would have had
a detrimental effect were it not for the increased costs and decreased revenues caused by
delays in the current situation.
The total expected benefit from the preliminary calculations, from both reduced costs
and increased revenues, is approximately $530,000. When we examine the original situa-
tion without delays, the situation is better and allows for less improvement. In this case, a
profit improvement of $325,000 could have been obtained. The difference between these,
over $200,000 per day, represents a delay-induced loss in the current situation which can
be recovered by increasing nonstop flights.
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Delays in Original and Improved Case for Continental
Original Case Replacement Case
EWR Operations 450 399
EWR Total Outgoing Delay, Minutes 1030 832
EWR Total Incoming Delay, Minutes 651 530
EWR Average Outgoing Delay 4.6 4.2
EWR Average Incoming Delay 2.9 2.6
EWR Flights Delayed 15 Min 17 18
IAH Operations 595 502
IAH Total Outgoing Delay, Minutes 1553 1067
IAH Total Incoming Delay, Minutes 754 448
IAH Average Outgoing Delay 5.2 4.4
IAH Average Incoming Delay 2.5 1.7
IAH Flights Delayed 15 Min 35 26
Systemwide Average Outgoing Delay 4.9 4.5
Systemwide Average Incoming Delay 2.0 2.0
7.2 Final Results
A hypothetical scheduled was generated based on the flight replacements suggested by
the preliminary calculations, and a full calculation based on a MEANS run using the new
schedule was performed.
The total number of flights at both the Houston and Newark hubs significantly reduced,
and so was the delay. Table 7.2 shows several statistics comparing the original and new
scenarios.
The overall results, in the form of operating cost and revenue for Continental, are shown
in Table 7.3. The net improvement was $551,000, which is very close to the preliminary
estimate of $530,000.
7.3 Conclusions
It appears that there are significant monetary gains to be obtained from cutting back on
hub flights in favor of nonstops, and that additional costs and lost revenue from delays
contribute significantly to this effect. As hub congestion increases, delays will increase,
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Table 7.3: Final Calculation Results
Historical Proposed
Scenario Scenario Change
Operating Cost 3538102 3766285 228183
Revenue 6373835 7152746 778911
Operating Contribution 2835733 3386461 550728
and the motivation to add nonstops will also increase.
A savings of $550,000 per day translates to over $49 million per quarter. For compar-
ison, Continental reported a net income of $42 million for the second quarter of 2001.[4]
Thus, while it unlikely that the entirety of the savings predicted will be realizable due to
additional constraints beyond the scope of the model, the potential improvement from in-
creased nonstop routings clearly merits serious consideration.
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Chapter 8
Directions for Future Work
There are several directions in which the work done here could be extended. These relate
primarily to additional capabilities in the MEAN simulation and additional calculations
relating to the replaced flights directly.
8.1 Other Airlines
A sample case for Continental was calculated here. A similar approach could be used to
calculate improvements for several of the other major carriers with a significant hub and
spoke network. This would allow for a comparison of hubs amongst carriers.
8.2 MEANS additions
There are several planned additions to MEANS which would allow additional work to be
done. In addition to general improvements in accuracy, MEANS is looking to integrate
with outside decision-support tools which will improve the decisions made by the hypo-
thetical airlines in the simulation. Additionally, the capability to route aircraft intelligently
for prolonged periods, including maintenance and disruption recovery, should allow the
simulation to be run for an entire season or entire year instead of a small set of representa-
tive days.
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8.3 More Sophisticated Scenarios
The replacement scenario generated here required that each new flight go back and forth
between two cities. A more sophisticated approach with greater flexibility might provide
superior results. This is particularly the case if a longer run of MEANS including mainte-
nance and crew scheduling requirements is also included.
8.4 Enhanced Calculations
The present calculations identified a set of flights in the preliminary stage and considered
a scenario replacing these flights in the final stage. A more sophisticated calculation might
be able to generate a scenario for all possible combinations of flights. If a few of the flights
were actually unprofitable in the final analysis in spite of being profitable in the preliminary
one, this approach would eliminate them, providing an optimum answer.
8.5 Shared Hubs
Some airports are hubs to multiple large airlines. Chicago O’Hare, for example, is a signif-
icant hub for both American Airlines and United Airlines. At these airports, the situation is
more complex, because if one carrier removes traffic, the other carrier may add additional
flights to fill up the space. This could ultimately lead to the carrier attempting to reduce
its hub operations being shut out of the hub entirely. A game-theoretic analysis applied to
this case could answer the question of whether it would be desirable to reduce flights at a
shared hub, or whether only hubs with one dominant airline benefit from such a reduction.
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Appendix A
Formulae, Values, and Data
A.1 Fits to Historical Data
A.1.1 Actual Flight Time
Two different formulae for flight time are available, one for the case where a “scheduled
time” is available (used in MEANS to calculate flight time for city pairs without historical
data), and one for the case where it is not. Equation A.1 shows the calculation of actual
airborne time from published gate to gate times; values are in minutes. Equation A.2 shows
the calculation from distance when a scheduled time is not available. Distance is in miles;
times are in minutes.
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Figure A.1.1 shows the actual airborne times and those calculated from distance for
cities where both are known. These cities are the dataset with which the fit was performed.
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Figure A-1: Airborne Time Calculated from Distance
A.2 Detailed Continental Results
Detailed results from the flight replacements for Continental, described in section 7.1, are
shown below. Table A.1 shows the flights which were replaced and their replacements.
Table A.2 shows the per-flight results of the preliminary calculations using these flights.
Table A.3 is a list of city abbreviations used in the other tables.
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Table A.1: Replaced Flights for Continental
Flight Replacement Cities Original Cities
N76073 LAX-MDW HNL,IAH
N19072 MCO-MDW HNL,IAH
N29124 MCO-SJU IAH,LAX,SFO
N14121 DEN-MDW EWR,IAH,SEA
N33132 MCO-MKE EWR,IAH
N17122 MDW-SFO ANC,EWR,IAH,LAX,SEA
N17104 LGA-MKE EWR,SEA
N68047 JFK-STT EWR,IAH,LAX
N78005 BOS-RDU EWR,IAH
N18112 FLL-MDW EWR,PBI
N17326 LGA-RDU BOS,IAH
N29717 BOS-MKE EWR,SNA
N16884 DFW-MKE EWR,IAH,SFO
N13891 EWR-MKE IAH,MIA,TPA
N21108 DFW-MDW EWR,FLL,IAH,LAX
N16703 LAX-MKE EWR,SNA
N14381 LIH-SFO DCA,EWR,IAH
N17233 MKE-PHL EWR,SAN
N69602 MDW-PHX BNA,EWR,IAH
N14115 DCA-MKE EWR,LAX
N14818 MDW-RSW IAH,MIA,PHX
N24706 DTW-RSW EWR,IAH,PDX,SJU
N12225 LGA-MDW CLE,EWR,IAH
N17663 DFW-LGB BNA,CHS,EWR,IAH
N14653 DEN-MKE BWI,CLE,LAX
N13720 SEA-SNA ABQ,IAH
N33817 CVG-PHL DCA,EWR,IAH
N14102 IND-RSW EWR,LAX
N10801 FLL-JFK DTW,EWR,PBI
N511PE BUF-LGA ATL,BWI,IAH
N12327 CVG-EWR IAH,MSY,SEA
N72825 LGA-STL BOS,DTW,EWR,IAH
N70353 CVG-LGA ATL,IAH,TUS
N14219 BWI-SAN EWR,IAH,SJU
N13227 KOA-SFO EWR,IAH,SAN
N38727 LAX-MRY EWR,IAH
N14346 LGA-MCI DFW,EWR,IAH
N16642 MKE-SFO DCA,IAH,RIC
N14106 CMH-LGA IAH,LAX,MCO,MSY
N57837 HOU-LAX IAH,MIA,MSY,SAN
N14668 IND-LAS ELP,IAH,RDU
N26210 FAT-LAX EWR,IAH,LAX
N72830 DTW-FLL DTW,EWR,TPA
N12811 LAX-OGG EWR,IAH,TPA
N14601 DCA-HSV AUS,EWR
N24715 BWI-SFO DCA,IAH,SAT
N33608 PSP-SEA ATL,COS,IAH
N33785 CLE-MKE IAH,LAS,ORD
N16217 LAS-MDW BUF,EWR,SEA
N16806 DTW-TPA DEN,EWR,MIA
N47332 JFK-MDW BDL,CLE,IAH,LAS,MFE
N69803 ORD-RSW EWR,IAH,TPA
N12218 FLL-ORD IAH,LGA,TPA
N69351 MIA-TPA EWR,IAH,IND,RSW
N26232 MIA-TLH BOS,CLE,EWR,IAH,SEA
N17644 BWI-OAK BNA,EWR,MSP
N14662 OGG-SFO IAH,RNO,SNA
N27722 CMH-MDW CLE,EWR,IAH,SFO,SJU
N19382 JAX-LGA IAH,MSY
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Table A.2: Preliminary Calculation Results by Flight
Without Delay Effects With Delay Effects
Existing New Op. Cost Rev. Rev. Total Op. Cost Rev. Rev. Total Difference
Flight Cities Change Loss Gain Change Change Loss Gain Change due to Delays
N76073 LAXMDW 8952 3423 38861 26485 8797 3121 43973 32055 5414
N19072 MCOMDW 3539 3423 39385 32423 3523 3434 43232 36274 3835
N29124 MCOSJU 1717 16444 40413 22251 760 12023 42197 29414 6205
N14121 DENMDW -1380 9869 30950 22461 -1562 9912 32112 23762 1118
N33132 MCOMKE 11839 1033 28313 15440 11794 957 31734 18982 3497
N17122 MDWSFO -8294 28306 28465 8453 -9225 26975 30688 12937 3553
N17104 LGAMKE -3995 15191 26384 15188 -4240 16042 29685 17882 2449
N68047 JFKSTT -5141 33482 28934 593 -5850 30481 29510 4879 3576
N78005 BOSRDU 4242 8329 25273 12701 4114 8308 29489 17067 4237
N18112 FLLMDW 15006 1844 28134 11284 14980 1560 29086 12546 1235
N17326 LGARDU 412 6773 22747 15562 283 6308 26672 20080 4389
N29717 BOSMKE 4605 5755 24275 13914 4582 5642 26373 16148 2211
N16884 DFWMKE -639 14103 23713 10249 -1115 12288 26343 15170 4445
N13891 EWRMKE 5129 7192 24125 11803 4685 5047 26323 16590 4343
N21108 DFWMDW -3220 27120 23923 23 -4707 21845 25400 8262 6752
N16703 LAXMKE 823 12896 20087 6368 684 12227 23956 11045 4537
N14381 LIHSFO 7742 6330 23347 9273 7590 4914 23896 11391 1965
N17233 MKEPHL 2822 6991 21627 11813 2768 7224 23753 13760 1892
N69602 MDWPHX 6549 6174 20994 8269 6310 5274 23610 12024 3515
N14115 DCAMKE 3221 10841 21005 6943 3196 12129 23316 7990 1022
N14818 MDWRSW 3508 14211 22270 4550 2762 10361 22855 9731 4434
N24706 DTWRSW -3336 15790 20266 7812 -3434 15810 22556 10180 2269
N12225 LGAMDW 3089 8485 20359 8784 3016 8322 22056 10717 1859
N17663 DFWLGB 5431 9361 20672 5879 5335 8898 21848 7614 1639
N14653 DENMKE -2068 15513 18409 4964 -2399 13832 20691 9257 3962
N13720 SEASNA 5777 6198 17084 5107 5733 6496 20670 8440 3288
N33817 CVGPHL 4568 6999 15850 4283 4401 7025 20559 9132 4682
N14102 INDRSW -4214 24631 18917 -1500 -4704 23617 20417 1503 2513
N10801 FLLJFK 3845 12858 18136 1432 3316 10842 20246 6087 4126
N511PE BUFLGA 587 13880 17050 2583 273 13179 20225 6773 3876
N12327 CVGEWR 2373 10199 16224 3651 2012 10167 20121 7942 3929
N72825 LGASTL 636 14868 15031 -473 -41 12953 19903 6991 6786
N70353 CVGLGA 3077 10271 15987 2637 2809 9901 19795 7085 4179
N14219 BWISAN 3476 10804 15411 1130 3410 10817 19774 5546 4349
N13227 KOASFO -1185 16225 17473 2433 -1387 16009 19750 5128 2492
N38727 LAXMRY -312 11432 18870 7749 -424 10606 19743 9561 1699
N14346 LGAMCI 6619 7875 16474 1979 6484 7996 19697 5215 3101
N16642 MKESFO 4238 13326 17260 -303 4038 13175 19676 2462 2566
N14106 CMHLGA -4150 22675 16070 -2454 -5109 22339 19399 2169 3664
N57837 HOULAX -51 20145 16656 -3436 -1006 16131 19378 4253 6735
N14668 INDLAS 7117 8446 17187 1623 7029 8736 19364 3598 1886
N26210 FATLAX -2624 12519 19243 9348 -2719 13428 19301 8592 -851
N72830 DTWFLL 5709 11642 17198 -153 5275 11111 19254 2867 2586
N12811 LAXOGG 6602 11110 17603 -109 6488 11116 19077 1472 1468
N14601 DCAHSV 5881 8490 17880 3508 5837 8946 19029 4244 692
N24715 BWISFO 7143 9590 15145 -1588 7049 9697 19028 2281 3776
N33608 PSPSEA 5706 9326 17688 2655 5633 9576 18988 3778 1050
N33785 CLEMKE -2446 21033 18103 -484 -3053 18676 18983 3360 3237
N16217 LASMDW -2600 22114 17634 -1879 -3438 20159 18958 2237 3278
N16806 DTWTPA 395 20308 15608 -5096 -368 16693 18923 2598 6931
N47332 JFKMDW -295 15318 17468 2445 -444 15692 18892 3644 1049
N69803 ORDRSW 4028 13790 17431 -387 3898 13980 18844 965 1223
N12218 FLLORD 6047 13486 17160 -2374 5846 11789 18628 992 3165
N69351 MIATPA -145 12670 17533 5008 -283 12739 18590 6134 987
N26232 MIATLH -5881 24668 17775 -1010 -6751 21012 18257 3996 4137
N17644 BWIOAK 4222 14537 17245 -1513 3940 13880 18181 360 1592
N14662 OGGSFO 3774 15196 16608 -2361 3670 13922 18147 553 2811
N27722 CMHMDW -6917 23302 17239 854 -7354 21229 18055 4180 2888
N19382 JAXLGA 8640 9072 15646 -2065 8571 8977 18051 502 2499
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Table A.3: Airport Abbreviations
ABQ ALBUQUERQUE INTL
ANC ANCHORAGE INTL
AND ANDERSON
ATL ATLANTA HARTSFIELD
AUS AUSTIN MUELLER
BDL HARTFORD CT/SPRINGFIELD BRADLY
BNA NASHVILLE METRO
BOS BOSTON LOGAN
BUF BUFFALO INTL
BWI BALTIMORE INT’L
CHI CHICAGO CHICAGO FSS
CHS CHARLESTON MUNICIPAL
CIN CARROLL
CLE CLEVELAND HOPKINS
CMH COLUMBUS INT’L
COS COLORADO SPRINGS PETERSON
CVG CINCINNATI CIN N.KNTY
DAL DALLAS LOVE
DCA WASHINGTON NATIONAL
DEN DENVER STAPLETON
DET DETROIT CITY
DFW DALLAS INTL
DTW DETROIT WAYNE CO
ELP EL PASO INTL
EWR NEW YORK NY/NEWARK NEWARK INL
FAL ROMA FALCON
FAT FRESNO TERMINAL
FLL FT. LAUDERDALE INTL
HAR HARRISBURG SKYPORT
HNL HONOLULU INTL
HOB HOBBS LEA COUNTY
HOU HOUSTON HOBBY
HSV HUNTSVILLE/DECATUR HUNTSVILLE
IAH HOUSTON INTERCONT
IND INDIANAPOLIS INTL
INL INTL FALLS
INT GREENSBORO/H.PT/WIN-SALEM REYNOLDS
JAC JACKSON HOLE
JAX JACKSONVILLE INTL
JFK NEW YORK NY/NEWARK KENNEDY
LAS LAS VEGAS MCCARRAN
LAX LOS ANGELES INTL
LGA NEW YORK NY/NEWARK LA GUARDIA
LGB LONG BEACH MUNICIPAL
LIH LIHUE
LOG LONGVIEW
MCO ORLANDO INT’L
MDW CHICAGO MIDWAY
MFE MC ALLEN
MIA MIAMI INT’L
MIT SHAFTER KERN CTY
MKE MILWAUKEE G MITCHELL
MRY MONTEREY PENINSULA
MSP MINNEAPOLIS INTL
MSY NEW ORLEANS INTL
NEW NEW ORLEANS LAKEFRONT
OAK OAKLAND INTL
OMA OMAHA EPPLEY
ORD CHICAGO O’HARE
ORL ORLANDO HERNDON
PBI WEST PALM BEACH INTL
PDX PORTLAND INTL
PHL PHILADELPHIA PA/WILM’TON INTL
PHX PHOENIX INTL
PSP PALM SPRINGS
RDU RALEIGH/DURHAM INTL
RIC RICHMOND/WMBG INTL
RNO RENO CANNON
RSW FORT MYERS REGIONAL
SAN SAN DIEGO LINDBERG
SAT SAN ANTONIO INTL
SEA SEATTLE/TACOMA SEA/TAC
SFO SAN FRANCISCO INTL
SNA SANTA ANA WAYNE INTL
STL ST. LOUIS INTL
TLH TALLAHASSEE MUNICIPAL
TPA TAMPA TAMPA
TUS TUCSON INTL
UMB UMNAK ISLAND
VEL VERNAL
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